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The MODERN LANGUAGE FORUM

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OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

CONTENTS

ROUSSEAU, MASTER OF PROPAGANDA.....	John C. McCloskey	121
THE PASSIVE IN ITALIAN, SPANISH AND FRENCH	Herbert H. Vaughan	132
ENGLISH "ARTISTIC PROSE" AND ITS DEBT TO FRENCH WRITERS	Fernand Baldensperger	139
REVIEWS:		
M. P. Bizzoni and G. P. Orwen, <i>Italian Reference Grammar</i> (Herbert H. Vaughan).....		151
Jay Wharton Fay, <i>A Practical Introduction to Spoken Modern Greek</i> (Herbert Hoffleit).....		152
Bess Sondel, <i>"Speak Up"</i> (James Murray).....		153
Fremont Rider, <i>The Scholar and the Future of the Research Library</i> (Laurence Clark Powell).....		156

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MODERN LANGUAGE FORUM

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ROUSSEAU, MASTER OF PROPAGANDA

IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY when the spirit of rebellion was stirring strongly in the social mass Jean Jacques Rousseau fired intermittent longings into flashing slogans and made articulate the desires of the masses for a "natural" life. That his revolutionary Arcadia should project itself backward instead of forward was quite logical. For he was, in reality, not searching for a Utopia of impossible human perfection; rather, he was investigating the origins of social and political institutions, and he therefore needed a sharp contrast to show that it was the ambition, the greed, and the cupidity of corruptible men that had brought about the Fall and had diverted human society into paths of error. The mere fact that things are as they are did not, he believed, give validity to institutions not based on justice, right, and the will of God.

In the *Discours sur l'Origine et Les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes*¹ he does not say that men should return to primitive times,² nor does he advise them to await the Millenium; but he does say, by implication and by direct statement, that something should be done about things as they are. He is not at all opposed to order, to government, but he is opposed to the *status quo*, in which the accidents of birth and wealth are held to confer the right of being proud in the sight of God and of forgetting the humility, the justice, the sympathy that man owes to man.

¹This paper is presenting the development of Rousseau's thought only up to the issuance of this *Discours*.

²In the Introduction Rousseau says: "The investigations we may enter into in treating this subject, must not be considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origins; just like the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world. Religion commands us to believe that, God Himself having taken men out of a state of nature immediately after the creation, they are unequal only because it is His will that they should be so; but it does not forbid us to form conjectures based solely on the nature of man, and the beings around him, concerning what might have become of the human race, if it had been left to itself. This then is the question asked me . . ."

The focal point of Rousseau's philosophy was not a primitive Arcadia, but the France of 1754. From his nature hypothesis he was inferring principles which applied to modern France, and the significant fact is not that he considered society bad, but the state of society as it then was. In the *Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité* Rousseau did not take the nature myth as a literal fact, though he did later exploit it as his main literary stock in trade. He explicitly says that it is a hypothesis built upon reason, conjecture, and surmise. He says that it probably never did exist and never would exist.³ It is not organized society that Rousseau hates; it is not that he wants men to return to a semi-brutalized state; his primary message is that things are wrong as they are. In the civilization produced by centuries of human error he saw the sad lot of the masses of men, and it was as a humanitarian and an advocate of social justice that he attacked a civilization which existed for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many: "... a few rich and powerful men on the pinnacle of fortune and grandeur, while the crowd grovels in want and obscurity. . . ." Social amelioration, not the impossible return to an unbearable Utopia, was the real purpose of the *Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité*. Rousseau was not a Utopian dreamer wandering among his chimeras, but a social critic who saw the deplorable truth about modern civilization and suggested methods of correcting the evils he observed. To accomplish his purpose he employed the nature hypothesis as a rhetorical device to make a strong contrast between the way things were and might have been, between great riches and great poverty, between slavery and liberty, between oppression and justice. As a matter of fact, he didn't, even in the *Contrat Social*, believe in absolute equality, nor did he advocate for modern nations unqualified democracy.

Like the effective propagandist he was, Rousseau constantly enforced the parallel between oppression and freedom, between the fact and what ought to be. The nature hypothesis was a rhetorical method of appealing vividly to the imagination of the masses, a concrete way of reaching the people—almost a parable—a means of showing them that in the beginning things could not have been as they are now and that the course of civilization

³ "What, then, is to be done? Must societies be totally abolished? Must *meum* and *tuum* be annihilated, and must we return again to the forests to live among bears? This is a deduction in the manner of my adversaries, which I would as soon anticipate as let them have the shame of drawing."

having been diverted from the right path, it was up to the people to right their own wrongs by having compassion on themselves. By projecting upon the screen of their consciousness this Arcadian vision, he gave them a pictorial representation of a better world, an illusion, it is true, but a powerful motivating force to a realization of their wretchedness. Thus the thesis of the *Discours sur l'Inégalité* was the contrast between a self-governing people, free because they owe their rights and duties only to themselves, and a government by the privileged class which by guile, deceit, and treachery had arrogated to itself the rights that belong to all. To say that Rousseau wanted man to return to the forest and become a savage naked in squalor and ignorance is to look for absurdities instead of truth. What Rousseau wanted was revolution.

The nature myth was a pastoral poem which disguised under the cloak of Arcadian longing an explosive revolutionary doctrine which was to sweep kings and princes, great ladies and courtesans from the face of the earth. Since so revolutionary a doctrine could not be boldly proclaimed, Rousseau, in his role of propagandist, sugar-coated it with a philosophical idyll, the doctrine of the natural man and the return to nature—by which he meant nothing more or less than liberty, justice, and equality. The *Discours sur l'Inégalité* is fundamentally a clever piece of political propaganda skillfully embedded in a pastoral poem, and Rousseau is not an Arcadian dreamer wandering among his chimeras, but a social philosopher who saw the truth about contemporary France and wrote his indignation into a half-realized allegory, for it is as a poet and not as a systematic philosopher that Rousseau must be ultimately considered.

In this bold piece of propaganda Rousseau embodied a convenient formula of revolt. The *Discours* attacked the *status quo* and was, therefore, radical and dangerous. Neither in the law of God, said Rousseau, nor in the physical laws that operate the world-machine and the man-machine⁴ is there anything that justifies master and slave, rich and poor, gluttony and starvation, lords of creation and serfs crawling servilely over the dung-hills of the earth. The oppressors of civilized man, who put society into the state in which Rousseau found it, have arrogantly

⁴The man-machine is distinguished from the animal-machine by free will and perfectibility.

taken to themselves by force, by guile, and by a lack of the virtue of humility privileges which are no one's rights. When God created the world-machine and man as well, He set the whole in motion and governed its workings in the state of primitive nature by certain "laws of nature" which were thus of divine inception.

Among these natural laws were liberty, equality, humanity, goodness, justice, and humility in the sight of God. Rousseau found harmony in nature—in things as God had made them before man interfered and corrupted them by laws, by customs, and by social conventions which distorted the order of nature and allowed the inhumanity of the rich and the powerful to oppress the poor and the weak. Bad morality is man's work; it is not part of the Divine design; it results from the abuse of human faculties, for man, having free will, has often made the wrong choice;⁵ it has deranged the machine of nature, that is, the laws of harmony and order which proceed from God.⁶ Rousseau saw no reason why that harmony could not be restored, not necessarily by a return to the cave, the woods, and the fens and to ignorance and barbarism, but by a reassertion of the fundamental laws of nature in regard to man, that is, liberty,

⁵Man holds thought, sentiment, activity, will, liberty, being from God. Man is free because He wills it; therefore those who go against the will of God—those who enslave and oppress other men—are wicked.

⁶There exist, says Rosseau, in nature (that is, in the state of things as designed by God, who stands behind the machine) certain rights—liberty, independence, justice, equality—which cannot, and should not, in any political society be superseded by man-made conventions (by the right of the strongest or by the success of guile, cupidity, and wealth in enslaving fellow creatures). When man interferes with the working of the machine, he departs from a state of nature. God, having created the world and having given its nature laws by which it operates, does not interfere. It is the baser instincts of man which throw a monkey-wrench into the machinery, and consequently it is these baser instincts that need curbing. Physical inequality comes from nature and from God; our natural infirmities are infancy, old age, and illness, for that is how the machine works, man being given a life cycle through which the world-machine in its course takes him. But political inequality flows from men, and is therefore not natural. To return to a state of nature means to return to the fundamental virtues that God intended to regulate the workings of the relationships of man to man. "Now, without a serious study of man, his natural faculties and their successive development, we shall never be able to make the necessary distinctions, or to separate, in the actual constitution of things, *that which is the effect of the divine will, from the innovations attempted by human art.*" Rousseau also speaks of the "divine inspiration, which teaches mankind to imitate here below the unchangeable decrees of the Deity."

justice, and equality before the law. Rousseau loved natural order (that of the goodness of the will of God manifesting itself in the operation of the world-machine) and saw justice in the preservation of that order. To Rousseau, then, nature meant getting back to the primitive virtues—to liberty, equality, and justice—to the making of the will of God prevail.

The Arcadia Rousseau looked back to was a state of nature, not of half-naked savages in a brute world, but a condition of liberty, justice, and equality before the law; and the Golden Age he looked forward to was the re-establishment *in modern society and among modern conditions* of this state of liberty, justice, and equality before the law (not before the same porringer, as Jules Lemaitre says), in which there are neither rich nor poor, neither tyrants nor oppressed, where men have compassion for their fellow creatures, pity for suffering, sympathy for the weak—a concept that will be radical so long as men exist. The desire for reason, happiness, and virtue made Rousseau a revolutionist, because the attainment of them would have meant the overthrow of all existing governments, as it would even today. Thus much of Rousseau's state of nature does not go back beyond primitive Christianity. Compassion for suffering, pity for distress, love or humanity are what all great Christian sects have long preached and seldom practiced. Rousseau was a religious man and for that reason a revolutionist, for to insist that a people be Christian in their hearts and in their deeds is to threaten any established political and social order with revolution. Be charitable, be kind, be merciful, be humble, be just, love your neighbor, clothe the naked, feed the hungry, give up all you possess and follow Me—what can aristocracy, privilege, greed, luxury, and wealth say except cry *radical*?

And so "nature" in the *Discours sur l'Inégalité* is a plea for the re-establishment of the fundamental, the "natural" virtues. Liberty, justice, equality, kindness, compassion, are the meaning of this nature allegory. What Rousseau wanted to do was to correct the disorders of a society in which human creatures lamented their existence and many deprived themselves of it. He opposed the pride, the vanity, the avarice of corruptible men which had interfered with the laws of the God behind the machine. The existence of a wrong system, even a successful one, rests upon no right; and any system that exploits the many for the benefit of the few is a wrong system. Human souls, more-

over, being equal in the sight of God, the system of human lords of creation is "unnatural."

In testing fact by right, Rousseau asserted man's natural right to life and liberty. Liberty is a God-given right, the noblest faculty of man, which no man can alienate. No man can so far sell his own liberty as to submit to an arbitrary power which may use him as it likes, nor have men the right to sell liberty of their children. Political government today, said Rousseau, is bad because it rests on the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power. Arbitrary power is the depravation of government resting government merely on the right of the strongest. Might does not make right, no matter how powerful the artillery! But despotism has trampled on both laws and the people; the rights of citizens and the freedom of nations have been slowly extinguished, and the complaints, protests, and appeals of the weak have been treated as seditious murmurings. Despotism is a "state of nature" based on the rule of the strongest, while the real "state of nature" is that in which notions of good and principles of equity prevail. Though the contrast of government has been dissolved by despotism, the despot is master only so long as he remains the strongest.

"There is oppression among us now," cried Rousseau. The rich and the powerful, with indolent pomp, domineer over the weak and the poor, who groan under servile submission to their caprices. "Ambitious chiefs have made their offices hereditary and have contracted the habit of considering the magistracy as a family estate and themselves as proprietors of the communities of which at first they were only the officers, of regarding their fellow citizens as their slaves and numbering them like cattle, among their belongings, and of calling themselves the equals of the gods and kings of kings." The usurpations of the rich have stifled the cries of natural compassion and justice. Men, deceived by the cheating trickery of the powerful into the hope of securing their liberty, have run headlong to their chains and submit to the yoke without a murmur. The rich man has forced the poor man to accept institutions as favorable to the rich as the law of nature (justice, equality, liberty) was unfavorable. The revolutionary propaganda floats over the whole surface of the *Discours sur l'Inégalité*. Society and law, it maintains, have bound fetters on the poor and given power to the rich. They have destroyed natural liberty, and for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals have subjected all mankind to perpetual

labor, slavery, and wretchedness.

But the fundamental maxim of political right, Rousseau the propagandist went on to say, is that people have set up chiefs to protect their liberty and not to enslave them. Every man is permitted to enjoy life and liberty, the essential gifts of nature. It is "... an offense against both reason and nature to renounce that at any price whatsoever." Liberty is a God-given gift, a "natural" gift, like intelligence and free will, a "natural" quality, like goodness and happiness. Liberty is a natural power which chooses the good and the true; and whoever takes it away, whoever gives it away is unnatural, for the principle of all action is in the will of a free being. Therefore, society is artificial, it is bad, in so far as it presumes that one man has the right to oppress another man—to take away from him his liberty of action. Government did not begin with arbitrary power; arbitrary government is a depravation of the state of nature; it is anarchy based on law of the strongest. Whoso is a man, is free!

The breath of hatred for the rich and the powerful and compassion for the poor and the weak run like a hot flame through the *Discours*. But they break through the nature myth and into white heat only now and then, as clever propaganda should do. Rousseau views the present state of society with contempt. These are the end-products of centuries of civilization! This is the best that the mind of man, the best that the arts and sciences, the best that kings and philosophers could do! What savage indignation his humanitarianism vents upon man's inhumanity to man!

"Do you not know that numbers of your fellow creatures are starving for want of what you have too much of?" "You have taken, you wealthy and powerful, more of the common subsistence than you have a right to or a need of." Like the expert propagandist he is, Rousseau makes a concrete appeal to the stomach, the last barrier to revolution. The great inequality in the manner of living provides too exquisite foods for the wealthy and leaves to the poor food that is unwholesome and insufficient for their needs.

"It is contrary to the laws of nature, however defined, that children should command old men, fools wise men, and that the privileged few should gorge themselves with superfluities, while the starving multitudes are in want of the bare necessities of life."

Social amelioration, the sermon of humanity to the intolerant

and compassion to the rich and powerful, and the incendiary plea to the people to right their own wrongs if the ruling classes were too steeped in indolence, luxury, and pride to be just in the sight of nature and of God—these are the burden of the *Discours sur l'Inégalité*. It is a humanitarian protest on behalf of oppressed, downtrodden peoples.

In no one were humanitarian instincts stronger than in Jean Jacques Rousseau. In no one was there more pity and compassion for the poor, the weak, and the oppressed. For the selfish luxury of the rich, which debases the poor, he had contempt, as of an unnatural thing.

"Luxury . . . under the pretense of giving bread to the poor, *whom it never should have made such*, impoverishes all the rest, and sooner or later depopulates the State. Luxury is a remedy much worse than the disease it sets up to cure; or rather it is in itself the greatest of all evils for every State, great or small, for in order to maintain all the servants and vagabonds it creates, it brings oppression and ruin on *the citizen and the laborer*; it is like those scorching winds, which, covering the trees and plants with devouring insects, deprive *useful* animals of their subsistence and spread famine and death wherever they blow."

Rousseau saw that the poor were wretchedly housed,⁷ that they were burdened with excessive labor, and that they toiled at a "multiplicity of unhealthy trades which shorten men's lives or destroy their bodies, such as working in the mines, and the preparing of metals and minerals, particularly lead, copper, mercury, cobalt, and arsenic: add those other dangerous trades which are daily fatal to many tilers, carpenters, masons and miners: put all these together and we can see, in the establishment and perfection of societies, the reasons for that diminution of our species, which has been noticed by many philosophers."⁸

The present condition of society is unnatural, maintained the author of the *Discours*, because it makes laws for the rich against the poor; it seems that the more society owes the poor man, the more it denies him. "Now it is important and necessary," said Rousseau, "that the government, above all, protect

⁷Rousseau was a precursor of modern housing, slum clearance, and rural or suburban living.

⁸Starvation, hovels, excessive and dangerous work for the poor; luxury, palaces, and indolence for the rich—these are the essentials of popular revolt.

the poor against the tyranny of the rich." But this it will not do, for the motivating virtue, compassion,⁹ belongs not to the rich and powerful, but to the populace. Nor is there anything to hope for from the philosophers.

Rousseau's propaganda wanted to show the people that there was no necessity for oppression, for slavery, for human suffering if the people would only assert themselves. The poor, the weak, the downtrodden must have compassion on themselves and right their own wrongs. Man does not have to submit to what is contrary to the law of nature and the will of God, for even the most adroit politician would find it impossible to enslave a people whose only desire is to be independent. The people must tear down those who have usurped the high places and must make liberty, justice, and equality before the law prevail. This they can do, for all political right rests upon a contract between the governed and the governing. When the fundamental laws of that contract cease to exist, the magistracy ceases to be legitimate. If the government has violated the contract, the people have the right to renounce it. If the king himself has the right to abdicate and thus renounce his part of the contract, if the magistrates can renounce their authority, the people themselves have a much better right to renounce their dependence. Revolution, pure and simple! This, briefly, is the message of the master propagandist, Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his *Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes*.¹⁰

In this *Discours* Rousseau was struggling with a problem that has not yet been solved, and to point to his failure in achiev-

⁹Compassion, in Rousseau's definition, is generosity, clemency, humanity applied to the weak, to the guilty, or to mankind in general. Its effects are benevolence and friendship. It identifies itself with the sufferer in his distress. It obeys the first promptings of humanity; it is a natural feeling that hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress.

"It is the populace that flocks together at street-brawls, while the wise man prudently makes off. It is the mob and the market women who part the combatants, and hinder gentlefolks from cutting one another's throats."

"Nothing but such general evils as threaten the whole community can disturb the tranquil sleep of the philosopher, or tear him from his bed. A murder may be with impunity committed beneath his window; he has only to put his hands to his ears and argue a little with himself, to prevent nature, which is shocked within him, from identifying itself with the unfortunate sufferer."

¹⁰Rousseau, however, like most propagandists, wanted to keep his head on his own shoulders. He cites Authority:

"By proceeding thus to test fact by right, we should discover as little reason

ing a perfect, systematic solution is to point to the failure of innumerable others down through Hoover to Roosevelt. Rousseau's temperament was essentially poetic, and he was, as Lemaitre says, a lyric poet as well as a rebel. But his greatest misfortune was that his literary capabilities confined him to prose. Had he the liberty of the poetic imagination and of poetic expression, had he the right to employ the devices of the pastoral and the allegory, had he the freedom to suggest rather than explicitly state, had he embodied his ideas in verse rather than in apparently exact philosophic prose, the result would have appeared to be more nearly what it really is—an unsystematic, poetical, Deistic suggestion of the *ideal* state of mankind. It would have illuminated a condition of life in which men are equal before the law because, being free, they cannot be enslaved even by their own consent, a state in which the conditions of justice are the same for all, for justice is only this equality, and a state in which the laws are made and executed for the good of all, for the particular will must ever conform to the general will.

The significance, then, of the *Discours sur l'Inégalité* lies not in the apparent desire that civilized men return to a savage state of nature, but in Rousseau's skillful and effective insertion of incendiary revolutionary propaganda into the body of an innocuous pastoral myth."

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as truth in the voluntary establishment of tyranny. It would also be no easy matter to prove the validity of a contract binding on only one of the parties, where all the risk is on one side, and none on the other; so that no one could suffer but he who bound himself. This hateful system is indeed, even in modern times, very far from being that of wise and good monarchs, and especially of the kings of France; as may be seen from several passages in their edicts; particularly from the following passage in a celebrated edict published in 1667 in the name and by the order of Louis XIV (Of the Rights of the Most Christian Queen over various States of the Monarchy of Spain, 1667).

"Let it not, therefore, be said that the Sovereign is not subject to the laws of his State; since the contrary is a true proposition of the right of nations, which flattery has sometimes attacked but good princes have always defended as the tutelary divinity of their dominions. How much more legitimate is it to say with the wise Plato, that the perfect felicity of a kingdom consists of the obedience of subjects to their prince, and of the prince to the laws, and of the laws being just and constantly directed to the public good."

"Rousseau was certain that revolution would come. In *Emile*, Book III, he said: "You reckon on the present order of society, without considering that

this order is itself subject to inscrutable changes, and that you can neither foresee nor provide against the revolution which may affect your children. The great become small, the rich poor, the king a commoner. Does fate strike so seldom that you count on immunity from her blows? The crisis is approaching, and we are on the edge of a revolution."

"In my opinion it is impossible that the great kingdoms of Europe should last much longer."

THE PASSIVE IN ITALIAN, SPANISH, AND FRENCH

THE TREATMENT OF THE PASSIVE VOICE given in our elementary Romance Language textbooks is generally vague and inadequate. We read, for instance, that "the Passive construction is little used in Italian, an Active being preferred" or "this voice is less frequently used in Italian than in English for the reason that, when no agent is expressed, the reflexive is preferred," that "In Modern Spanish the Passive is but little used as it is considered too lengthy and roundabout; its place is usually taken by the much overworked reflexive form of the verb," or "the Passive is less frequent in French than in English because of the following possible substitutes: (1) an Active verb with *on*, (2) a reflexive construction. The Passive, however, must be used in French when the agent or instrument of an action is expressed."

The student gets the idea that the Passive construction is, in general, one to be avoided. He correctly learns to say: *si parla italiano, se habla español, on parle français*, and comes to regard such a phrase as "He has been arrested," when it is to be translated literally into Italian, Spanish, or French, as simply a grammatical exercise in a form to be little used. But such is not the case. The Italian would certainly say: *E stato arrestato*, the Spaniard: *Ha sido detenido*, and the Frenchman: *Il a été arrêté*. Here it is clear that the reflexive could not be used as a substitute for the Passive because the meaning would be entirely different. It is true that in French the *on* construction would be possible, but still the Frenchman would prefer the Passive. Why?

Before answering the foregoing question it is well for us to examine another example in which the use of the reflexive would not lead to a distortion of the meaning. Such an example is offered by the translation of the English sentence "War has been declared"; Italian *La guerra è stata dichiarata*, Spanish *La guerra ha sido declarada*, French *La guerre a été déclarée*. Here the reflexive would be perfectly possible, but still the Passive is preferred. Why?

In order to make the Passive construction clear to the student it is, first of all, necessary to distinguish between two uses of that construction, one preferably called the "true" passive, and the other the "false" or "apparent" passive. As the definition

of the Passive Voice is "a verbal construction in which the subject receives the action" it is clear that there can be no true Passive unless there is action. "The house is surrounded by trees" could not then be a "true" passive, although we give it a Passive construction. "The house is surrounded by soldiers" is a "true" Passive only if it means "the house is being surrounded by soldiers" ("soldiers are surrounding the house"), i.e., if there is action, otherwise (in the sense of "soldiers are stationed around the house") it is "false." This "false" or "apparent" Passive is freely used in the Romance Languages. In Italian the agent or apparent agent or instrument is introduced by the preposition *di*, in Spanish by *de*, and in French by *de*. It is then only the restriction of the "true" Passive (indicating action) and the substitution of the reflexive or the *on* construction therefor which interest us. With the "true" passive the agent is introduced in Italian by *da*, in Spanish by *por*, and in French by *par*.

At times we find it difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between the "true" and "false" passives, there being some cases in which the verb may be regarded either as representing continued action and therefore being a "true" passive, or simply as representing a state or condition, which results in a "false" passive. Such cases usually involve verbs denoting mental, rather than physical, activity and occur usually in the Present and Imperfect (Past Descriptive) tenses, occasionally in the Future. They do not occur (nor does the "false" Passive occur) in the two past tenses which indicate the accomplishment of a single action in past time, namely the Present Perfect (Past Indefinite) and Preterite (Past Definite). There are in Romance many verbs which in themselves do not denote action at all, but which change their meaning to include action in the Perfect and Preterite tenses. Such are, for instance, *potere*, *sapere*, *volere* in Italian, *poder*, *saber*, *querer* in Spanish, and *pouvoir*, *savoir*, *vouloir* in French. *Potere*, *poder*, and *pouvoir*, for example, indicate simple potentiality. We might imagine that these verbs would be defective and not exist in the Perfect and Preterite tenses which refer to "a single action in past time." But such is not the case. They do exist and add action of accomplishment to their meaning. *Ho potuto farlo, he podido hacerlo, j'ai pu le faire* indicate actual accomplishment. The same is more or less true of the Future, but, being in future time, the accomplishment exists in the speaker's mind rather than in fact or deed. It is thus apparent that these tenses have a cer-

tain implication of action and a certain vividness which may be lacking in the Present and Imperfect. This is sufficient to prevent the use of the "false" passive and to overcome any objection to the use of the "true" passive in these tenses. While one would not say in Italian *La ragazza è morsa dal cane* or *La ragazza era morsa dal cane*, one would freely say *La ragazza è stata morsa dal cane*, *La ragazza fu morsa dal cane*, or even *La ragazza sarà morsa dal cane*. The Spaniard would not say *La muchacha es mordida por el perro* nor *La muchacha era mordida por el perro*, but he would not hesitate to say *La muchacha ha sido mordida por el perro*, *La muchacha fué mordida por el perro*, or *La muchacha será mordida por el perro*, and French usage shows conformity with Italian and Spanish.

To translate the sentence: "America was discovered by Christopher Columbus," the Passive is universally used in our Romance Language textbooks: It. *L'America fu scoperta da Cristoforo Colombo*, Sp. *La America fué descubierta por Cristóbal Colón*, Fr. *L'Amérique fut découverte par Christophe Colomb*. It is preferable to the Active because, in the first place, the more sonorous *fu scoperta* in Italian, *fué descubierta* in Spanish, and *fut découverte* in French leaves a more vivid impression on the student's mind than the more succinct and terser *scopri*, *descubrió*, or *découvrit* of the Active construction, both forms being equally expressive of action, and secondly, because *Cristoforo Colombo*, *Cristóbal Colón*, or *Christophe Colomb* in the Passive construction leaves a more lasting impression on the mind on account of its emphatic position at the end of the sentence.

We may be led to believe that the "true" Passive should properly be used only in those tenses which in themselves stress action, and be avoided, for example, in the Present and Imperfect. But we find that, although comparatively infrequent, the "true" passive does occur in these tenses. While the Italian would not naturally say *La ragazza è morsa dal cane*, he would not hesitate to say *La ragazza è consigliata dal padre*. What difference is there between these two sentences and what is it that makes one "bad" while the other is "good"? Since the construction of the two sentences is identical, the difference must lie in the meaning of the verbs. *E morsa* denotes one single, instantaneous action, while *è consigliata* denotes a continuity or repetition of action. If we put into the first sentence an adverb showing that the action is repetitive, the sentence becomes "good" Italian.

We have no objection (so far as grammar is concerned) to *La ragazza è morsa spesso dal cane*. In like manner *Questo libro è letto da Giovanni* may be considered "poor" Italian because it refers to a single reading of the book, but *Questo libro è letto da tutti* is "good." No Frenchman would say *Ce livre est lu par Jean* referring to a single reading, but no Frenchman would hesitate to say *Ce livre est lu par tout le monde*. The same remark would apply to the Spanish *Este libro es leído por Juan* as contrasted with *Este libro es leído por todos*. It is to be noted, however, that while this distinction is carefully observed in the spoken language, it is often ignored in the newspapers, especially in headlines. We read *La guerra è dichiarata*, *La guerra es declarada*, or *La guerre est déclarée* for *La guerra è stata dichiarata*, *La guerra ha sido declarada*, or *La guerre a été déclarée*. This may be for one of two reasons, or both reasons may have contributed to bring about this newspaper usage. It may simply be for the purpose of conserving space or it may just be a case of using the Present tense for greater vividness. Such usage seems to be common in all languages.

Such a phrase as *Questo lavoro è fatto* would normally be regarded as a "false" or "apparent" passive and be translated into Spanish *Este trabajo está hecho*. If it is I who have done the work, it is *il mio lavoro* or (in Spanish) *mi trabajo*. If my father has done it, it is *il lavoro di mio padre*, or *el trabajo de mi padre*. But if we make the idea repetitive, then we have a "true" Passive: "*Questo lavoro è fatto (ogni giorno) da me* or *da mio padre*, (in Spanish) *Este trabajo es hecho (cada día) por mí* or *por mi padre*. But spoken Spanish seems to favor more and more the use of the illogical and perhaps ungrammatical reflexive construction in such a statement: *este trabajo se hace por mí* or *por mi padre*. This may be due to the fact that Spanish has the two auxiliaries meaning "to be," *ser* and *estar*. *Ser* is properly used in the "true" Passive and *estar* in the "false" or "apparent." Confusion of these auxiliaries sometimes results, especially in cases where there is difficulty in determining whether the Passive is "true" or "false," such as in the English "It is forbidden," Italian *E vietato*. Here the Spaniard might interpret the idea as a "true Passive" in the Present tense in conformity with the usage which we find in newspapers and translate it *Es prohibido*, or he might regard it as a "false" passive describing a prohibition as a lasting condition, in which case he would translate it *Está prohibido*. Being in that dilemma,

he may have recourse to the reflexive which evades the question. As we have noticed all three usages in posted signs: *Es prohibido fumar*, *Está prohibido fumar*, *Se prohíbe fumar*, we believe that this explanation may be valid.

French may use the Passive in prohibitions in forceful, official language (*Il est défendu . . .*), but in signs and notices it is usually softened to the use of the abstract noun: *Défense de fumer*, *Défense d'afficher*.

To return to the phrase *Questo lavoro è fatto (ogni giorno) da mio padre*, if we wish to indicate that the work is being done at the present time, but have no adverb or adverbial phrase to indicate repetition or continuity, we can still use the Passive in Italian by substituting the auxiliary *venire* for *essere*. In this case we are projecting ourselves (theoretically) into future time subsequent to the completion of the act. We see this in *Questo lavoro viene fatto da mio padre*, "This work is being done by my father." This locution can also be used to express with the Passive construction a single act in Present time. While *La ragazza è morsa dal cane* is not a natural expression, *La ragazza viene morsa dal cane* is natural. One would translate it into English "The girl is about to be bitten by the dog" which is what we really mean when we say "The girl is being bitten by the dog." In fact "The girl is being bitten by the dog" is not a logical expression since the action of biting by the dog is practically instantaneous and could not last as long a time as it takes to utter that entire sentence. Neither French nor Spanish has this use of *venir* as an auxiliary.

Another auxiliary which is used in Italian and which looks towards the future (is prospective) much as *venire* is retrospective, is *andare*, which may be translated into English "is to be" and may suggest the idea of duty or obligation. *Va scritto così*, means "That is the way in which it is to be written." The idea of duty or obligation is, however, not always present. Such sentences as *I suoi libri vanno dispersi*, "His books are being scattered" and *Saranno andati perduti*, "They have probably been lost," present no such idea. Spanish has the auxiliaries *andar* and *ir* corresponding to Italian *andare*.

An example of the normal use of the Passive with *essere* and with *andare* is presented in the following sentence: *Questi dialoghi sono studiati e vanno provati e riprovati fino a che si possa recitarli con tutto il brio che conviene*. Here the intensity of the study is emphasized by the Passive with *essere* (instead

of the weaker Active or Reflexive) and the necessity of numerous rehearsals by the (still more forceful) Passive with *andare*. The change from Passive to Active (Impersonal) is made in the temporal clause because it is no longer the dialogues, but the *recite* (acting them out) which interests us. This impersonal *si* construction (which may take a direct object like the French with *on*) seems to be more active in its connotation than the equally grammatical reflexive construction which in the above sentence would be expressed by *fino a che si possano recitare*. We would translate the above sentence into Spanish *Estos diálogos son estudiados y van repetidos hasta que se pueda recitarlos con todo el brío conveniente* or *que conviene*. In this case a literal translation is an exact translation, which indicates almost perfect parallelism between the two languages. Translation into French, however, is more difficult due to the fact that French has only the one auxiliary *être* to form the Passive. One would probably emphasize the necessity of many rehearsals by using the more forceful *jus qu'au moment où* instead of *jusqu'à ce que*. The sentence would then read: *Ces dialogues sont étudiés et répétés jusqu'au moment où on pourra les réciter avec tout l'éclat convenable*.

Seguire. "continue to be," occurs in the Past Descriptive, Present, and Future: *La casa seguiva circondata da soldati*, *La casa segue circondata da soldati*, *La casa seguirà circondata da soldati*. One may say that there is no action in this case and that we have here an "apparent" passive which would call for the preposition *di* to introduce the agent, rather than *da*. But the difference is to be found in the possibly hostile attitude of the soldiers. If the soldiers belong to the enemy *circondata* assumes the more active idea of *assediate* and *La casa segue circondata da soldati* is equivalent to *La casa è assediata dal nemico*, that is anyone leaves it at the risk of being captured or slain. It is even possible that the commander of the company surrounding the house would say *La casa è circondata di soldati*, while the occupants of the house would say *La casa segue circondata da soldati*.

Italian and Spanish also have *rimanere* and *quedar*, which may be used as auxiliaries in the Passive construction, but these verbs seem to be true auxiliaries only in the Perfect and Preterite tenses. In the Present, Imperfect, and Future, they may be regarded as "main" verbs (instead of auxiliaries), and the past participle (with or without the agent expressed) as adjectival complement. *Rimase stabilito* and *E rimasto stabilito* stress the

idea of action, but *Rimane stabilito*, *Rimaneva stabilito*, *Rimarrà stabilito*, stress the idea of inaction (*rimanere*). In the same way in Spanish *Quedó fijado*, *Ha quedado fijado* stress action, while *Queda fijado*, *Quedaba fijado* and *Quedarà fijado*, stress the idea of *quedar*. When we come to other verbs listed as auxiliaries by some of the Spanish grammars, *verse*, *hallarse*, *sentirse*, etc., we find ourselves, as in the Present with *rimanere*, dealing with a "main" verb followed by a Passive participle complement. A participle is a verbal adjective, partaking of the nature of both adjective and verb. Sometimes the verbal force of the participle is predominant and the agent may even be expressed. In that case the agent will be introduced (in Spanish) by *por* if the participle is to be taken in the "true" passive sense, and *de* if it is a "false" passive. We may cite as examples such phrases as: *Se veía amenazado por el hombre* ("true" passive participle) *Se veía envidiado de todos* ("false" passive participle). A "main" (or independent) verb when followed by a passive participle complement does not seem to show in its tense values any relation to the "true" or "false" passive value of a participial complement. In other words a "main" verb in any tense may be followed by either a "true" or a "false" passive participle. Most French and Italian grammarians do not class these "main" verbs as "auxiliaries," although the agent of the action, or the apparent agent or implement of the condition, will be introduced by *par* in French and *da* in Italian, if the participle has a "true" passive meaning; and *de* in French and *di* in Italian if it is a "false" passive.

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ENGLISH "ARTISTIC PROSE" AND ITS DEBT TO FRENCH WRITERS

IT IS OFTEN CONTENTED that while literary "motifs" and precepts, or chance similitudes of expression, may be transmitted from one literature to another, transfers of *style* are barred by the very nature of what we call style, style being defined as "man himself," or at least as the manifestation of the "all and alone precious individuality" of a writer or of that collective being, a linguistic or national unit.

Such views, more or less related to the fatalistic conceptions of "race" that prevail in certain quarters, are in direct contradiction, not only to the very meaning of the word "*style*" (derived from *stilus*, the sharp pointed instrument used by the ancients for writing upon their wax tablets), but to a fact which nobody, to my knowledge, has expressed better than Thomas De Quincey in 1840: "It is certain that *style*, or the management of language, is able to yield a separate intellectual pleasure quite apart from the interest of the subject treated."¹ Thus there may be, through various devices, a deliberate striving for new and artistic forms of expression, which may afford the pleasure of which De Quincey speaks.

Not, however, until there was a marked decadence in English prose, was De Quincey's suggestion heeded by British writers. Loose sentence structure, careless wording (defects precluded from poetry by the nature of its form) had been accepted with leniency by indiscriminating readers and had, indeed, become firmly ensconced in English literature, where, to be sure, no distinction had ever been made between good prose and bad.

What is "bad prose"? Surely the most conspicuous example may be found in the jumbled hodge podge of our daily newspapers; but busy reporters and frantic head-liners may perhaps be pardoned a carelessness which in books and periodicals would be quite unpardonable. In the late sixties of the last century, such carelessness was rife both in books and in periodicals of repute, as if one of the educational mottoes of Victorian England, "to bring up children upon the Bible so that they might acquire a pure Anglo-Saxon style," had really attained more than its avowed purpose.

All prose fiction, then, and, as a matter of fact, any prose not following Macaulay's or Arnold's careful humanism, Carlyle's

¹De Quincey. *Collected Works*, ed. Masson. Edinburgh, 1890. x. 134.

or Ruskin's imaginative outbursts, was exposed to this utter disregard of form. Somewhere, George Gissing makes fun of the phrase: "The steamboat was replete with lavatories and a ladies saloon." Such miswording was, in truth, all too common. Another frequent defect was the abuse of epithets, and William Sharp pleased Henley immensely by his praise of *The King of Babylon* as "a romance without adjectives." A rector of Lincoln College, writing in a dignified periodical like the *Quarterly Review*, did not hesitate to put four *that's*, each with a different meaning, into one short sentence:

We are not quite sure *that that* Father of the Church is not giving us Lollius amplified with *that* latitude of invention which local history at *that* period allowed itself . . .

Anthony Trollope was criticized for his laxity in style. What had the author of *Cousin Henry* to say himself about the matter? In Chapter XII of his quite readable *Autobiography*, the chapter entitled *On Novels and the Art of Writing Them*, he requires that the novelist shall be—above all—"pleasant" and if possible, "harmonious." But by "harmoniousness" he means no more than an avoidance of uncouth phrasing. He writes: ". . . It will seldom come to pass that a novel written in a rough style will be popular . . . and less often that a novelist who habitually uses such a style will become so . . ." Chapter XIII, *English Novelists of the Present Day*, expresses satisfaction with Wilkie Collins, of all British contemporaries, and displeasure with Charles Dickens' "jerky ungrammatical style," unbearable to those readers "who have taught themselves to regard language."

As for the requirement that the novelist be pleasant, Trollope writes:

It is the first necessity of the novelist's position that he make himself pleasant. To do this, much more is necessary than to write correctly . . . He may indeed be pleasant without being correct, as I think can be proved by the works of more than one distinguished novelist. But he must be intelligible—intelligible without trouble . . .

Very lax, indeed, were Trollope's requirements and, hence, destined to attract innumerable followers of both sexes.

Could such a state of affairs find redress within the confines of England, without aid from abroad? Would recourse to Charles Lamb, Walter Savage Landor and Thomas De Quincey, those more exacting masters of a preceding generation, suffice to retrieve English literature from the shameful decadence into which it had fallen? Only by the emulation inherent in contact with a foreign literature can true literary awareness be stimu-

lated. Such contact had been established in England when, on January 11th, 1898, Arnold Bennett wrote in his *Journal*:

Only within the last few years have we absorbed from France that passion for the artistic shapely presentation of truth, and that feeling for words as words, which animated Flaubert, and the De Goncourts, and De Maupassant, and which is so exactly described and defined in De Maupassant's introduction to the Collected Works of Flaubert.

None of the (so-called) great masters of English XIXth century fiction had (if I am right) a deep artistic interest in form and treatment; they were absorbed in "subject" . . . Certainly they had not the feeling for words to any large degree, though one sees the traces of it sometimes in the Brontë's . . . never in George Eliot, or Jane Austin, or Dickens, or even Thackeray or Scott.

Yet that this feeling for words existed independently in England is proved by the prose of Charles Lamb and John Ruskin.

Such a testimony after the event demands closer investigation. Let us consider first the origin of the English and French movements towards artistry in prose, for though the dates and the exact nature of these movements in the two countries do not coincide, their causes are identical.

* * * * *

The first of such causes is, as we have seen, the born and trained writer's contempt for the poor stuff offered as literature by mediocre novelists or indifferent blue-stockings. Attacks on Trollope, Dickens, and the hopelessly bad successors of George Eliot and Thackeray, denunciation of the vulgar, colorless style used by the popular writers echo Theophile Gautier's or Flaubert's declaration of the rights and duties of the true prose writer in the years after 1836, when the emergence of the cheap dailies threatened to destroy what discrimination the public had possessed.

Secondly, there arose, belatedly in England, to be sure, because of the prolonged Victorian devotion to "respectability," an interest in "realistic" subject matter, impossible of treatment if its sordid features are not mitigated by artistry.

Thirdly appears, as a revival from the Renaissance, an appeal for artistry of form, as assurance of immortality, or of prolonged survival at least, since every intellectual bears in his heart the secret hope that books may, by their perfection of style, please a future elite of connoisseurs who will make their survival certain, even if these books will have lost their hold upon the general public for whom their subject matter may well no longer be of vital interest. Frederic Harrison expressed his belief in the cer-

tainty of such survival when on July 22, 1880, he wrote to George Gissing:

Books like that are not often written in England though they are sometimes in France. You will be neglected for a few months, abused for two or three, and in six have a distinct (but not altogether tranquil) reputation.

We have seen then that the English and French trends towards artistry in prose were motivated by the same causes. Their development, however, was rather different, the main difference being that whereas in France the Parnassians constituted a sort of "school," with a program admitted by the majority of them, in England, (with the possible exception of followers of Matthew Arnold at Oxford about 1875) there was no real group of men devoted to a common task and united for joint action, no "Defense et Illustration," no "Préface de Cromwell" rallying partisans and putting opponents on the defensive. Indeed the English situation is more complex and more interesting, since here it is individual writers who are feeling their way in the dark, seeking precedents and guidance in a "literary tradition" which threatened to last forever in a self-satisfied England. For it was only after there had been much such individual groping that Oscar Wilde mentioned an incipient "school" in an article in which he refers to the changes in novel-writing:

Nothing is more interesting than to watch the change and development of the art of novel-writing in this nineteenth century . . . In France they have had one great genius, Balzac, who invented the modern method of looking at life; and one great artist, Flaubert, who is the impeccable master of style; and to the influence of these two men we may trace almost all contemporary French fiction. But in England we have had no schools worth speaking of . . . However, it is only fair to acknowledge that there are some signs of a school springing up amongst us. This school is not native, nor does it seek to reproduce any English master. It may be described as the result of the realism of Paris filtered through the refining influence of Boston . . .

Such a compliment to Henry James does not alter the fundamentals of the problem, even if it does remind us that in such a colony of many mansions, unity of purpose could hardly have prevailed. Nevertheless, the evidence that recent French prose writers had adopted a style that enabled them to describe the base and sordid aspects of life artistically, and that the treatment of words and phrases was regarded as more important than inspiration or moral purpose, gave at once a new value to certain books considered hitherto as mere proof of French "decadence." And though there was as yet no concerted following of French

forms, France, which had been for some time rather despised in England, began to emerge slowly, and not only indeed for Meredith, author of an *Ode to France*, from what had been in the eyes of the Victorians its ignominy of "realism" and immorality in art.²

* * * * *

After this brief survey of the general background, let us consider now the individual approaches of those who, dissatisfied with the prevailing indifference to style, wished to introduce artistry into the writing of prose—an artistry for which they sought inspiration not only from such of those English predecessors as were recognised stylists, but also from men of letters abroad.

Walter Pater saw in Balzac, styleless as he is supposed to be,³ the tireless worker for whom effort counted more than inspiration in literary creation. "Le travail constant est la loi de l'art comme de la vie." Such a matter excluded at once the easy flow of Walter Scott, the charmer, and the inward vision of the seer, Carlyle, as well as the scribbling of prolix popular novelists. "Clarity of outline," on the other hand, was for Pater the characteristic of Mérimée's style, simple and natural, yet with "an eye ever on its object." But Gautier's *Mademoiselle de Maupin*, even if it was not, as for Swinburne, the "holy writ of beauty," remained in Pater's background an idol to be worshipped and consulted, as is evident from many passages of *The Renaissance* and *Marius the Epicurean*. Highest in Pater's Olympus sat Flaubert because of his anguished striving for perfection of form. It may even be said that Pater at fifty, as he is portrayed by his biographer Thomas Wright, studying his dictionary in bed in search of choice phrases, combines Gautier's celebrated

²For the parallel, but slightly different questions implied in their titles, cf. W. C. Frierson, *L'Influence du Naturalisme français sur les romanciers anglais de 1885 à 1900*, Paris, 1925; Louise Rosenblatt, *La Théorie de l'Art pour l'Art dans la littérature anglaise pendant la période victorienne*, Paris, 1931; Albert J. Farmer, *Le Mouvement esthétique et "décadent" en Angleterre (1873-1900)*, Paris, 1931; K. Hartley, *Oscar Wilde: l'influence française dans son oeuvre*, Paris, 1935.

³Henri de Régnier, in the course of a visit from the present writer, developed the view that, since Balzac "lacks style," he is not worthy of the reputation accorded his *Comédie Humaine*. He did admit, however, that Balzac had, after all, a style appropriate to his method, which was that of a nomenclator of human actions and their setting. This was, in a way, a repetition of Gautier's remark that Balzac never imprisoned "fair Helen" in his tower.

advice to know the correct sense and etymology of words and Flaubert's untiring effort to carve out verbal expression, as it were, until harmony is achieved between content and structure.

Pater's essay *On Style*, in the *Fortnightly* of December, 1888, reprinted in *Appreciations* (1889), presents so sympathetic a portrait of Flaubert as "the martyr of literary style" that we feel entitled to assume that Pater, too, strove just as earnestly for perfection and suffered as much. He writes:

The one word for the one thing, the one thought, amid the multitude of words, terms that might just do: the problem of style was there!—the unique word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, essay or song, absolutely proper to the single mental presentation or vision within. In that perfect justice, over and above the many contingent and removable beauties with which beautiful style may charm us, but which it can exist without, independent of them, omnipresent in good work, in function at every point, from single epithets to the rhythm of whole books, lay the specific indispensable, very intellectual beauty of literature, the possibility of which constitutes it a fine art.

To what extent did Pater experience anxieties and scruples such as those that both delighted and horrified him in Flaubert's confessions? Perhaps we shall never know. But in some phrases, definitely English, to be sure, but guided by a lead quite different from that which made Carlyle or Ruskin eloquent and impressive, there is apparent a distinct trend towards that objectivity and that impeccable plastic beauty that characterize Flaubert. Such a phrase is the following:

As Florian Deleal walked, one hot afternoon, he overtook by the wayside a poor aged man, and as he seemed weary with the road, helped him on with the burden which he carried, a certain distance. And as the man told his story, it chanced that he named the place, a little place in the neighborhood of a great city, where Florian had passed his earliest years, but which he had never since seen, and, the story told, went forward on his journey comforted. And that night, like a reward for his pity, a dream of that place came to Florian, a dream which did for him the office of the finer sort of memory, bringing its object to mind with a great clearness, yet, as sometimes happens in dreams, raised a little above itself, and above ordinary retrospect.

(*The Child in the House*, 1887)

An influence, related to a kind of "syncretism" which Flaubert expressed in *La Tentation*, is probably at work in Pater's attempt to give *La Gioconda* a shadowy background in which are fused various symbols of the "eternal feminine":

She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver of deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for strange webs with East-

ern merchants; and, as Leda, was the Mother of Helen and, as Saint Anne, the Mother of Mary; and all this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and flutes . . .

Indeed this portrayal of La Gioconda recalls that of Helen in Flaubert's *Tentation*:

Elle a été Lucrèce, la patricienne violée par des rois. Elle a été Dalila, qui coupait, les cheveux de Samson—Elle a chanté dans les carrefours. Elle a baisé tous les visages.⁴

* * * * *

The case of George Moore seems much simpler. And as I met this emotional Irishman in Paris several times (he was old then and writing an English prose colored by French preferences), I may be permitted to add personal impressions to the facts recorded by his unending recollections and confessions. There was always a close affinity between Moore and Gautier, and though Moore expressed admiration for Pater's *Marius the Epicurean*, "the only English narrative that men of letters will turn to in the years that lie ahead of us," and though he believed that Goethe's study of Saint Philip Neri in the *Italian Journey* was the source of Pater's style, he himself was obviously more profoundly influenced by Gautier. He asserts:

I read *Mlle. de Maupin* at a moment when I was weary of spiritual passion, and his great exaltation of the visible above the invisible at once conquered and left me captive . . . Here was a new creed proclaiming the divinity of the body; and for a long time the reconstruction of all my theories of life on a purely pagan basis occupied my attention.

Balzac, too, seemed to cast a spell upon Moore, as attested by the fact that Moore accorded him preference over Shakespeare; and Flaubert, with his painstaking search for the right word, his peremptory assertion that there is but one expression to convey the material aspect of any object, exerted a marked influence.⁵ If only Moore had fulfilled his promise, made near the close of his famous Balzac lecture, to give another lecture likewise in French, on Flaubert, we might have from his own lips the last testimony of an English prose writer's stylistic debt to a foreign writer. Even without such direct evidence, any informed reader

⁴B. Fehr in his *Walter Pater's Beschreibung der Mona Lisa and Théophile Gautier's Orientalism* (Archiv, 1916, CXXXV) seems to have overlooked this source of what was an important novelty in prose technique.

⁵Cf. W. B. Ferguson. *The Influence of Flaubert on George Moore*. Diss. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1934. "Preoccupation with revision" is demonstrated by R. A. Gettmann, *George Moore's Revisions* . . . in PMLA, June, 1944.

will perceive, in these opening lines of *Esther Waters*, a distant echo of Gautier, Flaubert and their disciple Maupassant:

She stood on the platform watching the receding train. The white steam curled above the few bushes that hid the curve of the line, evaporating in the pale evening. A moment more and the last carriage would pass out of sight, the white gates of the crossing swinging slowly forward to let through the impatient passengers.

An oblong box painted reddish brown and tied with a rough rope lay on the seat beside her. The movement of her back and shoulders showed that the bundle she carried was a heavy one, and the sharp bulging of the grey linen cloth that the weight was dead. She wore a faded yellow dress and a black jacket too warm for the day. A girl of twenty, firmly built with short, strong arms and a plump neck that carried a well-turned head with dignity . . .

It was, then, to the objectivity, precision and soberness of the French writers that George Moore's passionate nature was submitted, and it was from this exacting discipline that his successful restraint was developed.

Lack of discipline on the other hand, sealed the tragic fate of Oscar Wilde. When, on January 9, 1882, he delivered his New York address on *The English Renaissance of Art*, he was much too sure of a victory won, preposterous in his fanfare of triumph, sunning himself complacently in the glow of his beloved sun-flowers. Wilde cites Gautier, "most subtle of all modern critics," advising the young poets to read the dictionary every day "as being the only book worth reading," proclaiming as the absolute distinction of the artist "not so much his capacity to feel Nature, as his power of rendering it," and deploring the fact that since to most moderns the "visible world is dead," Art must serve as a substitute (a paradox which his own Dorian Gray was to endorse devotedly).

But Wilde was already overdoing "artistic prose" by subjecting it to all the exaggeration that characterized the decadent style in vogue and, what is more, he looked upon the abnormal as the only subject worthy of artistry. Offensive to the British middle-class was his declaration of an aesthetic war, and an unfortunate destiny might have been foreseen in the discordant elements of a fight that ended in Reading Gaol. The most enthusiastic of Pater's disciples, the unbiased appraiser of that "Holy Gospel of Beauty, *Mademoiselle de Maupin*," Wilde, instead of being true to those "impeccable masters," pretended to be unaware of the common man's vexation at any moral eccentricity not in accordance with the accepted standards. "The

Critic as an Artist" may be left in peace by the cockney or the jingo; but others than Mrs. Grundy take offense at "The Artist as an Immoralist." Had Wilde seen in August, 1880, a burlesque verse in *Punch*, he might have surmised the prejudice, rampant just then, against the tendency he was to bring both to a paradoxical climax and a devastating ruin. The verse is entitled *Art for Art from a Parisian Point of View*, and claims to voice the Frenchman's derision of the Englishman's subjection of art to morals.*

The Englishman's Art! Ah! ma foi, très ridiculous,
Borné, Beotian, maudlin, meticulous,
Bon père de famille, and thrall to the dutiful,
He's quite devoid of a true sense of the Beautiful.

Painter, it hangs on his Philistine neck a log,
Poet, he's dragged to the earth by the Decalogue,
While he is frightened of Nature and Nudity,
Slave he must be to Convention and Crudity.

George Gissing has, of course, to be added to this list. Ranking himself among those to whom Art is "dear for its own sake," possessing an avowed faculty to derive more pleasure from the imagery of things than from their reality (even the sea, for instance, he preferred in a beautiful evocation rather than in disturbing reality) he, like Gautier, who boasted that he knew the exact connotation of thousands of French words, tried to be first of all a careful student of etymology. When in 1890 he took his two sisters to Paris, he led them straight to Gautier's tomb, in the Montmartre Cemetery, as a shrine to be worshipped. The following year, he observed despairingly that, in spite of sympathetic critics like Edmund Gosse and George Saintsbury, of watchful aestheticians like John A. Symons, even in spite of the addition of great foreigners like Turgenev to the phalanx of "artistic novelists," there was only a very small public in England for anything but "popular" fiction.

And Gissing himself scorned to write popular fiction. The period of his life when he regarded Flaubert's method of prose writing as the only adequate one is characterized by books like *Workers in the Dawn*, called by him "a work of art, as which I desire to be judged," or by avowals like this passage from a letter to his brother, September 22, 1885: "I write more slowly

*A point evidently missing in D. Richardson. *Saintsbury and Art for Art's Sake in England* (PMLA, March, 1944).

than ever, but with infinitely more savour . . ."

Of the shortening of the novel he wrote approvingly:

One volume is becoming commonest of all. It is the new school, due to continental influence. Thackeray and Dickens wrote at enormous length, and with profusion of detail; their plan is to tell everything, and leave nothing to be devined. Far more artistic, I think, is the later method, of merely suggesting; of dealing with episodes instead of writing biographies. The old novelist is omniscient; I think it is better to tell a story precisely as one does in real life . . .

When finally, in the *Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft*, Gissing defines Art "as an expression, satisfying and abiding, of the zest of life," he does not hesitate to cite the great care with which Flaubert fixed the bounds of his schemes before elaborating them—a process to which few writers of fiction in Victorian England had been willing to consent.

Among the adherents of the new "school" were writers of less prominence. Among them was John Payne who, though he shows little foreign influence, was deeply interested in literary form, as is manifested by his avowal in *The Art of Authorship* (1890) that "a very early delight in word analysis" made the dictionary "as pleasant as a novel" to him. R. Le Gallienne had a like interest, and he extolled Flaubert, whom he called "the classical example of artistic fanaticism in modern times," for his painstaking quest of perfection of form and pointed with admiration to his heroism in "calmly correcting the proofs of his new poems during the siege of Paris."

* * * * *

But the year 1895 brought with it, not only the condemnation of Oscar Wilde, but many reactionary movements in various quarters. Then indeed did literary style fall into disregard and art become subservient to morals. As this was, for this writer, the occasion of his first visit as a student to London and Edinburgh, he can testify to the distress that prevailed in artistic and literary circles, and indeed to the stupor that permeated all intellectual life. No longer did there exist any "school" to provide a course of action more well defined than that of mere post-Ruskinian appeals to beauty, or denunciations of the industrial ugliness that everywhere was rife under the pretentious epithets of "powerful" or "dynamic."

Some critics like Edmund Gosse held the field, pointing out foreign merits worth transplanting; others like Saintsbury re-

turned to a rather indifferent acceptance of any form that suited the novelist's purpose.

So the hopes entertained by some of the writers concerned had doubtless been somewhat deluded. Pater, indeed, shared Flaubert's audacious views concerning the "prose style of the future" when he quoted from the Correspondance:

Style, as I conceive it, style as it will be realized some day—in ten years, or ten generations! It would be rythmical as verse itself, precise as the language of science; and with undulations—a swelling of the violin! plumage of fire! A style which would enter into the idea like the point of a lancet; when thought would travel over the smooth surface like a canoe with fair winds behind it. Prose is just of yesterday, it must be confessed. Verse is, par excellence, the form of the ancient literatures. All possible prosodic combinations have been already made; those of prose are still to make . . .

Even for the living generation, the episode was over about the end of the nineteenth century. Though there has been an élite of English writers devoted to the highest standards of prose style (how deeply devoted I know through personal acquaintanceship with William Sharp, George Moore, Edmund Gosse, Mr. Granville-Barker, and George Gissing's widow), these students have been condemned and discarded by the general public, and to what degree an experience of my own may indicate. I have seen *Mademoiselle de Maupin* offered in the French original and in English translation in the windows of quite disreputable shops, behind Saint Paul's Cathedral, among objects not exactly associated with pure beauty.

In addition to such rejection of stylistic standards on the part of the general public, there was a recognized reaction among the arbiters of style, which caused the pendulum of good prose to swing from plasticity back to rhythm, from sculpture and painting back to acoustics and oratory. And now, too, it is the inward stimulus rather than the outward appearance that constitutes for Professor Elton and others the essence of good writing. Indeed D. H. Lawrence proposed to adopt as his motto not "Art for Art's sake" but "Art for my sake." The absence of stringent rules governing form was apparent in Walter de La Mare's lecture in the British Academy in 1935. His introduction of quantity, and even scansion, into his examples (with utter disregard for repetitions of words, alliteration, assonance, and the like) indicates certainly a background entirely different from that of the earlier movement that we have been considering.

Even as a passing episode, however, even as a sporadic

phenomenon in English prose-writing, the influence exerted by French writers cannot be overestimated. First, because some books of enduring value have been the result of a movement which, brief as it was, proved to be rich in consequences. Second, because the way was opened, through a new form of expression, to the use of new subject matter. When Lafcadio Hearn, in a Tokyo lecture, complained apropos of Baudelaire that "the English language is not perfect enough, not graceful and flexible enough to admit of elegant immorality," he spoke in the late '90's, just when the introduction of new themes and the cultivation of style were well under way. To be sure, as Hearn suggests, the ordinary Victorian's indifference to style complicated his natural dislike of indecency and thus further restricted the subjects that he considered appropriate for literary treatment. Thus a conflict arose between Mrs. Grundy and the rare worshipper of beauty from which there emerged, with renewed audacity, a small group of stylists who resented what they regarded as Mrs. Grundy's too easy victory.

And so George Moore was probably correct in another of his predictions, in which he associated artistry of form with the admission of new and broader subject matter: "If the realists," he said, "should catch favor in England, the English tongue may be saved, for with the new subjects they would introduce, new forms of language would arise . . ."

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REVIEWS

M. P. Bizzoni and G. P. Orwen. *Italian Reference Grammar*. King's Crown Press Division of Columbia University Press, New York, 1943. (pp. 170.)

In their *Italian Reference Grammar* Miss Bizzoni and Mr. Orwen have done a very creditable piece of work. This does not mean, of course, that the book is entirely without mistakes. The perfect grammar will probably never be written. Grammar, after all, is only an attempt to tabulate the psychology of a language and psychology defies accurate tabulation. Moreover, as stated in the *Foreword*, the book was published hurriedly and without sufficient revision.

Following are some of the points which should be revised in a second edition:

Page 3, IV. 2. should read "Nouns ending in *-cia*, *-gia*, *-scia*" etc., omitting the words "a diphthong" since these do not present diphthongs. Page 4, D. 1. should read . . . "The plural in *i* is to be taken in an individual sense, while that in *a* is collective: Examples: *Le lenzuola del letto*, "the sheets of the bed," but *due lenzuoli* (in a laundry list). Page 5, E. *Natale* is used in the singular to mean "Christmas." Page 6, line 3 should read "has the strength of a verb (instead of *adverb*). Page 6, 3., line 2 should read "depends upon it, usually as object of the preposition *di* understood." Page 6, IV, line 5, *-da* should read *-ca*, and in the following line we should read "the original sound of *c* and *g* in these words."

Page 11, 1. a, the statement should be made that these titles are used with Christian names. Page 12, last line, *Tedesco* should not be capitalized.

Page 15, line 3, "a portion of the whole is indicated" would be better than "expressed or implied." Page 16, C., *milione* has but one *l*. Page 17 1. should read "adjectives of quantity agree with the noun" etc. In the same paragraph *paziena* should read *pazienza*. On the same page in the Note under E, we should read "*Senza* followed by a personal pronoun . . ." striking out "used simply in adverbial sense."

Page 33, line 1 should read ". . . meaning the *latter* and the *former*" rather than "the *former* and the *latter*." Page 34, III. B., line 3, the period should be omitted at the end of the Italian line. Page 36, G, line 2, *Qualunque* is an adjective. *Checchè* or *qualunque cosa* may be used for the English pronoun "whatever."

Page 40, IV. A. line 4, "before" should be "after." Page 42, line 7, *Loro* is subject. Page 43, C. Note 1, line 4, "The main verb" should read "the Infinitive" to avoid confusion. Same page, IX, A. line 5, "Anche *tu*" is better than "Anche *te*." Page 45, line 3, "*Tu*, io e *Giovanni*" is better than "*Te*, io e *Giovanni*." Same page, M. line 4, "*se ciò fosse possibile*" would be better than "*se ciò era possibile*." Page 52, I. C. Note should read "when in English we might use an *adverb*." Page 53, III, A. lines 10 and 11, *non* is pleonastic and is often omitted. Page 58, G. line 8, *Loro* is subject. Same page, H. line 3, insert "*si . . . si*" may often be translated "*both . . . and*."

Page 59, line 2, "infinite" should read "infinitive." Page 62, VI. E gives the impression that if the preceding direct object is a noun it may or may not agree. The examples given throughout the book are of non-agreement. The

reviewer believes that agreement is more common among the educated than non-agreement.

Page 84, D. Attention might be called to the fact that the infinitive usually takes the article if it begins the sentence. Page 85, XII. A. We should be told when the Infinitive may be used for an Imperative.

Page 91, V, line 3. ". . . di buon'ara" should read ". . . di buon'ora." Page 93, line 1. "Non lasciarti rubare" should read "Non lasciarti derubare."

Page 108, I. leads one to believe that forms with or without *-isc-* are optional. Page 130, *Amare* may well be omitted from list of verbs requiring no preposition because it is not frequently used and the student should be discouraged from using it when he should use *piacere*. *Desiderare* should also be in the list of verbs taking *di*. The difference between *pensare a* and *pensare di* (pages 131 and 132) should be noted. Page 133, *smettere* should be included in list of verbs taking *di*. Page 135, line 13, *ambi* should be in parentheses as it is little used. Page 156, the abbreviations for *signora* and *signorina* should be given. Page 157, abbreviation *C.fr.* should read *Cfr.* Also the meanings of *u.s.*, *p.v.* and *corr.* should be given.

The book has many excellent features. Especially to be noted are pages 22 and 23 on the comparison of adjectives and the use of *che* and *di*; page 30, the paragraph dealing with English "a . . . of mine", and Paragraph VIII on pages 42 and 43. The treatment of the subjunctive (pages 71 to 76) is excellent and the sequence of tenses (pages 81 and 82) is well handled. Page 91, VI. makes a statement concerning the omission of the reflexive with the infinitive after *fare*, *lasciare*, *vedere*, etc., which is lacking in many grammars and is well put. On page 94, (III and IV), the treatment of impersonals is exceptionally well done.

Other features which add to the usefulness of the book are the letter forms, pages 152-155, and the list of current abbreviations, pages 156-7.

On the whole one may consider the book both useful and usable and especially adapted to a class in advanced conversation and composition. It is a grammar which will be much appreciated by students writing free composition in essays or dialogue.

HERBERT H. VAUGHAN

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* * *

Jay Wharton Fay. *A Practical Introduction to Spoken Modern Greek*. 1940. New York. Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. \$1.25.

The war has brought home to many the necessity of quickly learning the *Umgangssprache* in a foreign country or a foreign "colony." It is obvious that this colloquial idiom often varies widely, even in forms and vocabulary, from the polite and literary dialects. In Modern Greek this is particularly apparent. Mr. Fay "makes no apology for using [in the book before us] the Vernacular exclusively," and promises to provide for the transition to the language of the newspaper by the content of a Reader to follow; the present text of some 90 pages offers 1500 fundamental words together with good practical exercises and instruction in the necessary grammar, idioms, and inflections. Each lesson

is provided with samples of Greek sentences ready-translated into English, for the student to assimilate before he tries himself independently upon new ones. At the head of each lesson is a Greek proverb to memorize. Grammatical designations are given in both languages. In form and content the conversational needs are kept in mind, so that a faithful learner ought unquestionably to be able to make himself at home in the society of Greeks as soon as he has completed the course.

If one comes to this study from Ancient Greek or other languages, he will find much to interest and amuse him. A little reflection will bring out that words strangely barbaric in initial appearance are often after all legitimate descendants of common expressions in the older tongue. Forbiddingly disguised as *ligos*, *pete*, *milo*, *mera*, *pao*, *leo*, *troeis*, *Phlebares*, *pselo*, *omorpho*, are old friends like *oligos*, *eipete*, *homilo*, *hemera*, *hypago*, *lego*, *trogeis*, *Februarius*, *hypselos*, *eumorphos*, and many others. The signs for the future tense and the infinitive mode prove on inspection to be familiar words! One may further spot evidence of international commerce in expressions such as *gharsoni* fr. Fr. *garçon*; *geleki*, *gilet*; *mpratso* fr. It. *braccio*, and so on. Is not *roloï* the Spanish *reloj*? Is *ap' exo* a version of Germ. *auswendig*? *Exypnos* also somewhat dubiously suggests German! A few more examples might be amusing: *mprabo*—*bravo*; *poulia*—*poules*; *krema*—*crème*; *pio*—*più*; *mpyra*—*birra*; *phrouto*—*frutto* or *fruto*; *mpanio*—*bagno* or possibly *baño*; *ghriso*—*gris*. Declensions and conjugations have gone a long way in the direction of other tongues. So it will be hardly shocking to confront the result of semantic changes in the following: Is he black rough or dark? Or. Is the black white or obscure? Really meant is. Is the *ink* white or black? Etymology no longer denotes "true meaning."

This is intended only to show by a few specimens how interesting Modern Greek can be. Our book observes system but has an eye for the practical. There seem to be but few typographic errors. The accent in words like *anesyche*, *metaphrase*, *anoixe*, the spelling of *phainete* when translated "it seems" are mysteries unavoidable to most users of the language; in fact respelling would obviate the difficulty in three of these cases! Not every user will know precisely what "overlearning" (p. 2) is.

The collotype printing is admirably clear; altogether, this is an attractive, serviceable little book.

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* * *

Speak Up, by Bess Sondel. The University of Chicago Book Store, 1944. Pp. vi, 70.

During the last fifteen years quite a few books have been published whose chief concern has been the meaning of words. Some of the discussions have treated the basic aspects of semantics; others have expanded the fundamental implications of the subject until, taken in combination, these books have dealt with the major portion of human knowledge. Thus, Korzybsky has broadened the implications of the original thesis, e.g. the meaningful aspects of language in communication, to describe a philosophy of life; and Dewey (social psychology), Bridgman (physics), Schiller (logic), Bloomfield (linguistics), and

Chase (economics), have treated semasiology in relation to particular realms of learning. Some authors have presented simplified or popular accounts of the subject (Chase, Hayakawa, Walpole); others (Schiller, Bloomfield, Morris) have offered technical expositions. Most discussions have been directed principally to written communication; a few, in a restricted sense, have applied to oral expression.

As the subject of semasiology attained general recognition as a method of expressing thought, speech instructors gave increased recognition to the significance of language symbols by emphasizing their essentiality to effective speech communication. However, the consequences of this pedagogy were increasingly unfavorable, as the study of word meanings failed to enhance the relationship requisite to complete rapport between the speaker and listener. In fact, semantic technics excluded consideration of the expression or reception of thought. Again, the scope of language treatment did not exceed the consideration of related ideas as expressed in related words. The feeling of need for a communicative relationship was indicated by Schiller (*Formal Logic*) in his recommendation that the student should be encouraged to reason "... with plastic terms and growing meaning." As a consequence of the inapplicability of semantic theory to oral communication, the recent history of the study of significant language symbols in speech instruction has been one of progressive de-emphasis. However, there is a present need for new and improved technics of oral communication, due to a heightened emphasis on the impartation of thought, rather than self-expression, as the primary objective in speech.

In the manual, *Speak Up*, Bess Sondel expounds a plan for increasing the approximation of oral communication and experience. The method is to remove the restrictive effects of objectivity in the study of word meaning by enlarging the scope of semantic considerations. The new procedure accomplishes this expansion by adding elements of emphasis to the speaker-listener relationship. Toward the realization of this objective, the author postulates the following tenets: (1) every human being is unique; (2) every individual is a unique organism-as-a-whole; and (3) every human being is an organism-as-a-whole in an environment (p. 4). Restated, the author, combining the views of social psychology and relativistic philosophy, essays to augment the rapport between the speaker and hearer by assigning new recognition to the flexible interrelationship of the human being and his changing environment.

Most semanticists are concerned primarily with the investigation of three principal factors in language communication: the word, the speaker, and the object to which the word refers (symbol, thought, referent). In many cases, these writers direct attention to the "language situation" as a frame of reference in which a speaker uses words to relate to something in life (*designata*). The manual of Bess Sondel proposes to include a fourth factor, the listener, in this frame of reference, using the nomenclature, "speech situation," to indicate the enlarged perspective. This expansion of scope, providing a vinculum between the speaker's words and the minds of the auditors, assumes the following functional obligations: (1) to report facts (referential terms); (2) to express experiences, beliefs, judgments; and (3) to influence opinion by means of "motivational terms" (p. 13).

Expository of this pragmatic viewpoint is the author's treatment of the scope of language. In this connection it is indicated that, at one extreme, words are

sharply referential and employed with scientific precision. Such accuracy of language usage often appears in mathematical reports and the empirical findings of investigations in the physical sciences. When these conclusions are expressed in terms of language rather than numbers, they are in most cases verifiable and generally acceptable. Similarly, in the biological sciences, there exists a degree of communicativeness in reporting which corresponds to the empirical control, or verifiability, of the terms.

At the other extremity in the range of language, terms are used to communicate thoughts which are virtually inexpressible, as in the vocabularies of the humanistic studies and social sciences. Expositions in these fields of knowledge commonly utilize high-order abstractions: "labor," "democracy," "freedom," "beauty," and "soul"; words for which there is no yardstick of judgment. When such terms are employed, their connotative, and consequently their communicative, values are restricted. Thus, the objective of the public speaker should be the approximation of a common basis of understanding between himself and his auditors. And his method, then, should be the replacement, insofar as possible, of expressive terms (opinions) by strictly referential terms (facts); and the substitution for high-order abstractions, of words which partake of the experience of, the auditors.

Stimulating to the present reviewer was the discussion of the challenges to clear analysis and synthesis which beset the speaker in his formulation of judgments. Among the fallacies of most frequent occurrence is the use of generalization, rather than specificity, concerning people and things. Examples of such defective reasoning are the formulation of universal judgments from a few characteristics or attributes, and the classification of groups of people and objects according to qualities of a few members or units. In this connection, the author's adaptation of Korzybsky's plan of mental indexing provides a practicable technic of semantic methodology. The procedure, which derives from emphasis upon the uniqueness of people and things, comprises two operations: the first, indexing by dating, is illustrated by "War 1917 is not War 1944; Smith 1943 is not Smith 1944." The second, founded on individual differences, is exemplified as follows: "Turk 1 is not Turk 2; Turk 2 is not Turk 3" (p. 28).

Having emphasized the desirability of flexibility in the speaker's communicative style, the author turns to a consideration of a correlative factor, stability, as represented by the structure of the speech. In this section (Part II) are described rather conventional procedures for gathering and working research materials, determining the subject and purpose of the speech, and arranging the order of the parts. The principles are given prominence that congruence of structure should not be attained at the expense of the creation of a hiatus between the expressional, and factual, validity of the proposition; and that a definite interrelational confluence should exist between the propositional structure and "realia."

Brief discussions of the psychological and physiological aspects of communication compose the contexts of the latter portions of the manual. These elements of speech delivery are indicated rather than elaborated, since the major emphasis of the work is the clarification of the significative factors of language communication.

In conclusion, the new exposition of the relationship of semantics and

speech should encourage the re-evaluation of the potential contributions to speech instruction of a pragmatically-adapted semantic procedure, and inspire further investigation of the speaker-auditor interrelationship in communication. Without doubt the subject merits additional exploration, for there is much to be discovered. In the words of the author: "The field is as wide open as . . . an increasing knowledge of human relationships can make it."

The manual, which has "outgrown the classroom," is derived from ten years of teaching. It was published initially in 1943 under the title, "Practical Applications of Current Theories to Speech." The second edition (1944) contains an added section with the designation, "Communication Analyzed."

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* * *

Rider, Fremont. *The Scholar and the Future of the Research Library, a problem and its solution*. New York, Hadham Press. 1944. xiii, 236 pp. \$4.00.

The past ten years have seen microfilms of books, newspapers and manuscripts introduced in varying degree into every research library in the country. By this means the younger libraries have been able to acquire materials which would never be available to them in their original forms. These include the whole body of books produced in England from the invention of printing until 1640, rare Colonial Americana, rare newspapers, and manuscripts.

The price of reading machines was steadily decreasing, until the war halted their production. The principle of microfilm is that of reading a magnified strip, illuminated by transmitted light. A few years ago the Readex Corporation developed a new process which they called Microprint. Materials are reproduced on photographic paper, greatly reduced, and the prints are read in a machine which employs reflected, rather than transmitted light. By this method it is possible to get as many as 250 pages of an ordinary book on a single 3x5 card. The enormous corpus of the British Sessional Papers is being reproduced in microprint. Paper prints are easier to use and store than rolls of microfilm.

With this development in mind, Fremont Rider, Librarian of Wesleyan University, conceived a radical and far-reaching project. Faced with the fact that American research libraries are doubling in size every sixteen years, Rider felt the necessity of solving the problem. Doubling every sixteen years has continued now for three centuries, and so far American libraries have been able to absorb the growth. Sooner or later, though, the situation will become impossible. If the Yale Library, for example, continues at its present rate of growth it will in 2040 have approximately 200,000,000 volumes, which will occupy over 6,000 miles of shelves!

Rider has attempted to analyze this problem in the light of microprint. His solution, simply stated, is that this tidal wave of library accessions be checked by reproducing the vast bulk of little-used library research materials in microprint on the backs of the 3x5 cards in the public catalog. Simple, isn't it? Thus the catalog card for a given volume becomes as well the text itself!

The application of the author's scheme would basically alter the appearance and use of the great research libraries. It would also make available to the

smaller libraries, in every part of the world, immense bodies of research material. In fact, individual scholars, no matter where their location, could have in a few drawers of 3x5 cards *the entire literature of their subject*.

Fremont Rider is not a crackpot. He has had a wide experience in editing, publishing, and librarianship. His book warrants the most serious reading and thought. I commend it to scholars in institutions of every size, from the university to the high school. It is a work of great vision, intelligence, and courage.

LAWRENCE CLARK POWELL

University of California Library, Los Angeles

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